Observations on Some Technical Terms in the *Vimuttimagga and their English Translations: An Examination of Jiā (夾) and Visayappavatti

KYUNGRAE KIM

DEPARTMENT OF BUDDHIST STUDIES, DONGGUK UNIVERSITY

Wizkyung@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

In the Chinese text of the *Vimuttimagga, namely the Jiětuō dào lùn (解脫道論), the word jiā (夾) is used as a technical abhidhamma term. It is used to refer to an initial cognitive activity through the five material sense organs. In the published English translation, the term is not understood clearly.

There are similarities and differences between the two terms, jiā and visayappavatti. They are linked to similar doctrinal structures and technical terminology, especially the concept of bhavaṅga, which is a distinctive doctrine of Sri Lankan Theravāda. On the other hand, visayappavatti implies an initial cognitive activity by any of the six sense organs, while the term jiā refers to an initial cognitive activity only through the five material sense organs.

A comparative study of the two terms proposes the following implications. Firstly, the text *Vimuttimagga is related to Sri Lankan Pāli abhidhamma because the orientation of the two terms is more than similar. Secondly, the text represents an early phase of the extant Pāli abhidhamma because the term jiā is less mature terminology than the term visayappavatti.

Keywords
jiā, visayappavatti,*Vimuttimagga, Jiětuō dào lùn, cognitive process, bhavaṅga
Introduction

This article examines the meaning and English translation of abhidhamma terminology in the treatise called Jiětuō dàolùn (解脫道論, hereafter JTDL). The original Indic text is lost, but the whole text is preserved in a Chinese translation, and a part of it in a Tibetan translation. The JTDL is placed in the Ronshū-bu (論集部), the thirty-second section of Taishō shinshū daizōkyō (大正新修大藏経, T32 no. 1648). This implies that the JTDL was not categorized by the Taishō editors since they used Ronshū-bu for collecting those treatises which could not be classified into any categories. According to the opening lines of the JTDL (399c11–12), the text was written by Yōu-bō-di-sha (優波底沙) and translated by Sēng-qié-pó-luó (僧伽婆羅) during the Liang dynasty (502–587). These are the only facts known about this text, although more has been proposed on the basis of speculation.

On the basis of the evidence above, some scholars consider the JTDL to be the Chinese translation of a lost original Pāli text, the *Vimuttimagga, which has sometimes been attributed to the Abhayagiri fraternity of Sri Lanka. This is known as a rival to the Mahāvihāra fraternity, the mainstream of the extant Pāli tradition. According to Kate Crosby, however, we do not have any evidence for a specific Indian or Sri Lankan origin or language of the text, to say nothing of affiliation with the Abhayagiri fraternity. Furthermore, she verifies that the Pāli title *Vimuttimagga for the JTDL was first suggested by P.V. Bapat in his book Vimuttimagga and Visuddhimagga, a Comparative Study published in 1937, and is not based on any textual evidence (Crosby 1999, 515). Since there is a rich diversity of opinion about its origin, language and school-affiliation, I shall hereafter refer to this text by its Chinese name rather than by the reconstructed Pāli name, *Vimuttimagga.

There is an English translation of the JTDL from 1961, published as The Path of Freedom, by N.R.M. Ehara, Soma Thera and Kheminda Thera. This has formed the basis of current understanding of the structure of the treatise and its relationship with Pāli abhidhamma, especially with the Visuddhimagga and Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha. Most scholars refer to this translation when writing about the *Vimuttimagga in English, and this present article is also indebted to the pioneer translation by Ehara et al. Given that the translation was published more than fifty years ago, however, the perspectives and translations in The Path of Freedom have been reviewed and criticized by scholars including Peter Skilling (1994, 181–82), Kate Crosby (1999, 511–513) and Lance Cousins (2012, 86). Therefore, in part, this

---

1. Which is based on a presentation delivered at the XVIIth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (Vienna, 2014).
3. In this article, the Pāli references of Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha follow the Bodhi edition (2010).
4. Important studies on the *Vimuttimagga which I do not mention in this article are: Nagai 1919; Hikata 1933; Sasaki 1958; Mizuno 1978; Endo 1983; Naniwa 2001; Hayashi 2003–2005; Anālayo 2009a and 2009b. These studies are important for research on a variety of aspects of the *Vimuttimagga. However, apart from three Japanese sources (Hikata 1933; Mizuno 1978 and Naniwa 2001), the other articles discuss neither the cognitive process nor the term jiā. Therefore, I will not further mention their research in this article.
Observations on Some Technical Terms in the *Vimuttimagga

The article re-examines features of the English translation, identifying certain mistranslations, and suggests how we might better understand the relevant terms.

In the following discussion, in order to illuminate the problems in The Path of Freedom, I shall analyse the specific abhidhamma term, *jiā*, which is found in the JTDL, comparing it with its closest Pāli counterpart. The term in question is discussed in a section on the cognitive process (T32 no.1648, 449b5–c16) which arises by an initial cognitive activity by any of the five material sense organs (*五門*, *pañca-dvāra*). Although the JTDL briefly discusses this cognitive process, it employs slightly different concepts from those found in Pāli *abhidhamma*. The translators of The Path of Freedom overlooked these differences and missed crucial points in their interpretation of the Chinese sentences. Therefore, I shall propose a revised translation of the relevant term, namely *jiā*, in this text, while also scrutinising the Pāli parallels with this problematic concept.

For our discussion, I shall begin by examining the occurrences of *jiā* in the JTDL. The term occurs ten times in the section of the text related to the cognitive process. I will examine these ten sentences using the existing English translation, and illuminate their problems. The appropriate meaning of *jiā* as an *abhidhamma* technical term, which is wholly different from its general usages, will also be demonstrated. After that, I shall suggest the closest possible Pāli equivalents to *jiā* and demonstrate their similarities and differences. Furthermore, based on the examination of *jiā*, the salient features of the JTDL will be suggested as a conclusion.

Before starting the discussion, however, it will be beneficial to review the term *bhavaṅga* of Theravāda *abhidhamma* theory as general context. Consciousness in Theravāda is seen as momentary, and our experience of continuous awareness as actually composed of a continuous stream of mind-moments. The term *bhavaṅga*, called *yŏufēn-xīn* in the JTDL, denotes a state that functions as the ground for the arising of active mind-moments. *Bhavaṅga* is a non-active state from which individual moments are stimulated to arise through contact between a sense organ and a sense object, and these moments emerge through a specific sequence of seven states: adverting (*āvajjana*), seeing (*dassana*), receiving (*sampaticchana*), investigating (*santīraṇa*), determining (*votthapana*), *javana*5 and registration (*tadārammaṇa*). This process is described in the JTDL by a simile of a sleeping king (449b18–c8). When a king who was surrounded by his followers was sleeping in his palace, one guest came to the palace in order to present a mango to him. The king woke up and ordered his followers to take the mango and prepare it. In this simile, the *yŏufēn-xīn* is compared to the sleeping king (*如是如王臥如有分心可知* 449b26), and the active mind-moments to the followers who are working under the king’s orders. It implies that the active mind-moments arise from the *yŏufēn-xīn* while simultaneously it also implies that the active mind-moments are based on the non-active *yŏufēn-xīn*, just as there is no waking up without sleeping. (It should be noted that the same simile for *bhavaṅga* in the JTDL is also found in the Atthasālinī (279–280). I will discuss this in detail in another article on the concept of *bhavaṅga* in the JTDL.)

---

5. The term *javana* was translated as ‘impulsion’ by Nāṇamoli (1979). However, I am not convinced that this translation covers the whole meaning. As with *bhavaṅga* (translated by Nāṇamoli as ‘life-continuum’), I shall use the original Pāli term *javana* rather than using an unsatisfactory English translation. Note that all the states up to *javana* are seen to last for one moment in Theravāda *abhidhamma*, but *javana* is seen to last for seven moments.
Ten occurrences in the JTDL

The word jiā is found 5,577 times in the CBETA Chinese Buddhist texts collection (CBETA Chinese Electronic Tripiṭaka Collection, Version April 2014). Generally, from the original semantics, the word jiā describes an activity of capturing something. It comes to mean ‘to press from both sides’, ‘carry something under one’s arm’, ‘to be sandwiched’, ‘hold’, ‘catch’, ‘seize’, ‘pincers’ and so on (Hànyǔ dà cídiăn (汉语大词典) Vol. 2, 1502). From these general implications, the word sometimes refers to palm leaves pressed tightly between two wooden book-covers, namely, ‘a text’. Different from these general usages, however, jiā as an abhidhamma technical term indicates, I argue, ‘an initial cognitive activity of contacting an object by the five material sense organs’ in the cognitive process section of JTDL (see pages 237–238 below on etymology.)

The term jiā occurs ten times in JTDL. Its meaning, however, is not revealed clearly in the English translation of 1961, as below:

1. ‘arising of ... distinctive thought’ (以彼夾勝心起 449a8; Ehara et al., 254) — jiā is not translated.
2. ‘How, through the arising of distinctive thought’ (問云何以夾勝心起 b5; 255)? — jiā not translated.
3. ‘Three kinds are fulfilled at the eye-door. They are objects of very great intensity, great intensity and slight intensity’ (於眼門成三種除夾上中下 b6; 255). — jiā translated as ‘object of intensity’.
4. ‘Of these, those of very great intensity fulfil seven stages’ (於是上事以夾成七心 b7; 255) — jiā translated as ‘intensity’.
5. ‘... is conditioned by the visible object at the eye-door’ (於眼門色事夾緣故 b10; 256) — jiā not translated.
6. ‘... is the impact of the visible object on the eye-door’ (如是於眼門色事可知 b28; 256) — jiā translated as ‘impact’.
7. ‘Here, consciousness depending on the impact of objects of middling intensity at the eye-door proceeds up to apperception and immediately lapses into the life-continuum’ (於是眼門以中事夾 c9; 257) — jiā translated as ‘impact’.
8. ‘Through the impact of objects of lower intensity, consciousness lapses into the life-continuum immediately after determining’ (以夾下事令起心無間度有分心 c9–10; 257) — jiā translated as ‘impact’.
9. ‘At the mind-door there is no impact of object’ (於意門無事夾 c11; 257) — jiā translated as ‘impact’.

6. We can easily find this kind of usage in Buddhist texts, as follows: [My] past thoughts were restricted (‘昔見之至夾也’ Chú sānzàng ji jí (出三藏記集) T55 no.2145, 73c24–25); ‘This path is sandwiched between two rivers’ (是路兩邊夾二江水) Fóshuō lì shì āpítán lùn (佛說立世阿毘論) T32 no. 1644, 184a4–5; 186a6; 186c5; 187b11; 188a13; 189a8).
7. As a synonym of jīngjiā (經夾), the term fànjiā (梵夾) refers to Sanskrit or Buddhist texts written on palm leaves (pattra, Fóguāng dà cídiăn (佛光大辭典), 4631). For example, ‘If [one sees] a picture of the Tathāgata in the Buddhist scriptures ...’ (‘或經夾中畫如來像者’ Dàshēng bō yào yī lún (大乘寶要義論) T32 no.1635, 54c26); ‘The sacred texts of Buddhist scriptures, completed on palm leaves’ (梵夾靈文貝多葉上成 Mì jì lì shì dà quán shén wáng jī jì sòng (密跡力士大權神王經偈頌) T32 no.1688, 783b05).
10. ‘Thus one should know through manifestation of the interlocking of distinctive thought’ (如是彼夾勝心起可知c16; 257) — jiā translated as ‘manifestation of the interlocking’.

Among these, four sentences, nos. 3, 4, 7, and 8 are accompanied by terms referring to a cognitive grade or degree of consciousness, namely, shàng (上), zhōng (中) and xià (下). These three grades confirm that these four cases describe a degree of cognitive intensity or impact. Nor does this understanding bring about any problems in another two cases, nos. 6 and 9. Therefore, the previous translators, Ehara et al. did not hesitate to translate the term jiā as ‘intensity’ or ‘impact.’ However, they have not translated the term jiā in another three sentences, 1, 2 and 5, and largely as a result of ignoring jiā they offer odd translations, for example the seemingly incomplete sentence: 2 ‘How, through the arising of distinctive thought?’. Finally, they translate the term jiā in the last sentence 10 as ‘manifestation of the interlocking.’

We can see that Ehara et al. offer inconsistent translations of the very same phrase ‘夾勝心起’ which is mentioned three times (1, 2 and 10). Ehara et al. rendered this phrase ‘through the arising of distinctive thought’ in the first and second sentence, and as ‘through manifestation of the interlocking of distinctive thought’ in the last sentence. Then they add footnotes to the first and last sentence, 1 and 10, remarking ‘Unintelligible’ and ‘Not quite clear’ respectively (Ehara et al. 1961, 254, 257). Therefore, in order to understand the term jiā more clearly, we need to examine closely the ten sentences above.

The cognitive process section in the JTDL consists of two sub-topics, namely, the cognitive process initiated via the five material sense organs, and the cognitive process initiated by the mind-organ. Sentences 1, 2 and 10 discuss the general topic of the cognitive process, namely active mind-moments in terms of jiā. The remaining seven sentences are devoted to the two sub-topics just mentioned. The first sub-topic is described in 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. Sentence 9 occurs in the second topic, namely, the discussion of the cognitive process in the mind organ.

**Jiā and the bhavaṅga**

In each of three sentences 1, 2 and 10, there is to be found another important technical term, shèng-xīn (勝心). Ehara et al. translate this as ‘distinctive thought’. With this translation, however, we cannot understand the technical implications of the term. I propose to translate this term as ‘active mind-moments’ since shèng-xīn is either based on, or arises from the non-active state, namely the state of yǒufēn-xīn (有分心) which exactly corresponds to the Pāli term bhavaṅga. According to the JTDL, the shèng-xīn (active mind-moments) arise from the state of yǒufēn-xīn (bhavaṅga) due to jiā, and, at the same time, consists of seven kinds of active mind-moments, namely, adverting (轉心), seeing (見心), receiving (所受心), investigating (分別心), determining (令起心), javana (速心) and registration (彼事心). This state is contrary to the one in which there is no active mind-moment taking place, namely, the state of yǒufēn-xīn. In the JTDL the relationship between the active mind-moments (shèng-xīn) and the non-active bhavaṅga (yǒufēn-xīn) is explained with an elaborated simile of a sleeping king, as mentioned above.

From the above understandings of the term shèng-xīn in sentences 1, 2 and 10, the primary meaning of the term jiā is clarified. It is something which initi-
ates a series of the active mind-moments (shèng-xīn) from the non-active state (yōufēn-xīn). Here, we should take note of the implications of the term jiā being intimately related to the concept of yōufēn-xīn, namely, the bhavaṅga. (On the relationship between the cognitive process and the concept of bhavaṅga, see Karunadasa 2014, 138–151.) According to the Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa (Dāshéng chéng yè lún, 大乘成業論) of Vasubandhu (fourth century CE), the concept of bhavaṅga comes from Tambavaṇṇiya (赤銅鍱部經中建立有分識名, T31 no.1609, 785a14) (see Lamotte 1987, 67; Anacker 1984, 114). The term Tambavaṇṇiya or Tāmraparṇīya (赤銅鍱部) represents the robe colour of the southern monks, especially Sri Lankan monks (Lamotte 1988, 536; on the term ‘Tāmraparṇīya’ in relation to Sri Lankan Theravāda, see Cousins 2013). It is accepted that the bhavaṅga doctrine was exclusively developed by the Sri Lankan Pāli Theravāda tradition and was understood to have been so from at least as early as the time of Vasubandhu.⁸ Therefore, by this juxtaposition, the term jiā is related exclusively to the Pāli abhidhamma. Furthermore, it implies that the JTDL is very close to Sri Lankan Theravāda.

**Jiā and ‘impact’**

The relationship to extant Pāli abhidhamma becomes clearer in the six sentences above (3–8) which explain the cognitive process through the five material sense organs. According to the sentences 3, 4, 7 and 8, jiā is classified into three grades, namely, shàng, zhōng and xià which mean ‘upper’, ‘middle’ and ‘low’ respectively. It implies that there are three kinds of jiā which initiate three different series of active mind-moments, namely three different cognitive events.

In the case of Pāli abhidhamma, especially in the Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha (Bodhi 2010, 152–53; Wijeratne and Gethin 2002, 120) there are four grades of visayappavatti (the presentation of an object to consciousness) which initiate four different cognitive events through the five sense organs, namely, ‘very great (atimahanta)’, ‘great (mahanta)’, ‘slight (paritta)’ and ‘very slight (atiparitta)’. These grades refer to the different degrees of impact which can occur between the cognitive object and the five sense organs. The first grade, ‘very great’, gives rise to the full seven kinds of mind-moments from the bhavaṅga; the ‘great’ and ‘slight’ to six and five kinds of mind-moments respectively. The ‘very slight’ only initiates the vibration of the bhavaṅga without producing any active mind-moments at all.

The three grades shàng, zhōng and xià of JTDL correspond perfectly with the first three grades in the Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha, atimahanta, mahanta and paritta, as shown here:

**上:** 有分心→轉心→見心→所受心→分別心→令起心→彼事心→有分心  
**中:** 有分心→轉心→見心→所受心→分別心→令起心→速心→有分心  
**下:** 有分心→轉心→見心→所受心→分別心→令起心→有分心

**Atimahanta:** bhavaṅga → pañca-dvāra-āvajjana (advertence at the five doors) → cakkhu-viññāṇa (eye-consciousness) → sampaṭicchana → santīraṇa → votthapana → javana → tad-ārammaṇa → bhavaṅga

---

⁸ The term bhavaṅga and an early form of the cognitive series are also found in the Paṭṭhāna of the canonical Pāli abhidhamma. For this, see Cousins 1981.
**Observations on Some Technical Terms in the *Vimuttimagga***

**Mahanta**: bhavaṅga → pañca-dvāra-āvajjana → cakkhu-viññāṇa → sampaticchana → santirama → votthapana → javana → bhavaṅga

**Paritta**: bhavaṅga → pañca-dvāra-āvajjana → cakkhu-viññāṇa → sampaticchana → santirama → votthapana → bhavaṅga

**Atiparitta**: bhavaṅga → atīta bhavaṅga → bhavaṅga calana → bhavaṅga

(No active mind-moments arise, but only a transition between the states of bhavaṅga.)

**JTDL** thus shares in large part the understanding of impact that comes to be formulated by Anuruddha in his *Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha*.

Therefore, from an understanding of sentences 3, 4, 7 and 8, we can see the function of jīā, which is to initiate the three different cognitive events following its cognitive impact in three grades. Furthermore, in sentences 5 and 6, we can see two technical terms, namely, eye-organ (眼門) and visible object (色事). They are mentioned here, as is commonplace elsewhere in abhidhamma, to represent all of the five material sense organs and all of their corresponding objects. Therefore, the term jīā should be understood to relate to the five material sense organs and their objects.

It should be noted that the term jīā is usually accompanied by an object shì (事) in the **JTDL**. For example, 色事夾 (449b10; 27–28), 中事夾 (449c9), 夾下事 (449c9–10) and 無事夾 (449c11). It implies that the term jīā, as a verb, noun or gerund, describes a cognitive activity itself rather than a cognitive agent or object. Therefore, we can assume that the term conveys a rudimentary cognitive activity. Acturally, we already have this same semantic range demonstrated by the familiar Sanskrit verb grah. It defines not only ‘to hold’ but also ‘to recognize’, and is usually translated in Chinese as chí (持) which means ‘to hold’ (*Apte*, 678; *Sanskrit-Japanese Dictionary*, 441). The fact that the term jīā is sometimes defined as chí strongly supports this understanding (*Dàsòng chóngxiū Guǎngyùn* (大宋重修廣韻), 543). To demonstrate whether the term jīā is related to the root grah or not, of course, needs more evidence. Nevertheless, the close relationship between jīā and chí in Chinese abhidharma terminology shows us that the term jīā possibly conveys a cognitive activity, similar to derived words from the root grah.

We must now turn to the remaining occurrence of jīā. Sentence 9 discusses the cognitive process in the mind-organ (於意門無事夾). Ehara *et al.* translate sentence 9 as ‘At the mind-door there is no impact of object.’ This translation is problematic. According to this translation, there is no cognitive grade such as shàng, zhōng and xià at the mind-organ. However, the **JTDL** moves on to explain the threefold cognitive grades in the mind-organ from the very next sentence, 於上事三心生. Ehara *et al.* translate this sentence as ‘By the very great intensity of an object, three mind-moments proceed’. If the word ‘impact’ had been only applied to the five material sense organs, and ‘intensity’ to the mind-organ distinctively in their translation, this translation would have been understandable. Or, it would have been reasonable if they had used the word ‘intensity’ in relation to the six sense organs consistently. Ehara *et al*, however, used these two words without any distinction or additional explanation in their translations, for example, sentence 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9. Therefore, for the proper translation of sentence 9, a footnote

---

9. ‘Rudimentary’ because only states which follow actually recognize the nature of the object and respond to it.

© Equinox Publishing Ltd 2016
should be added to convey that such ‘impact’ only occurs in the case of the five material sense organs, and the cognitive reception of the object makes no ‘impact’ but just has an intensity that has different cognitive degrees at the mind-organ.

Given that the term jiā clearly conveys a cognitive activity at the five material sense organs, I understand sentence 9 as meaning, at the mind-organ, there is no initial cognitive activity such as that of the five material sense organs. The JTDL provides other technical terms for referring to ‘a cognitive activity at the mind-organ’ namely, zuò yì yuàn (作意緣) and jiĕ tuō xíng (解脫行). I shall discuss these two terms elsewhere since both terms deserve a full discussion. There is, however, no doubt that the JTDL defines three different cognitive activities for referring to the start of the cognitive process through all six sense organs. The first type is jiā, an initial cognitive activity through the five material sense organs. The other two types are zuò yì yuàn and jiĕ tuō xíng, the cognitive activity in the mind-organ.

The two terms: jiā and visayappavatti

For further understanding of the term jiā, we need to mention briefly three Japanese sources here: (1) Hikata, Ryūshō (干潟竜祥), 1978[1933], Kokuyaku Issaikyō (国訳一切経); (2) Mizuno, Kōgen (水野弘元), 1978 [1964], Pāli Bukkyō wo chūshin toshita Bukkyō no Shinshikiron (パーリ仏教を中心とした仏教の心識論); (3) Naniwa, Sensō (浪花宣明), 2001, Shin Kokuyaku Daizōkyō (新国訳大蔵経).

Hikata, the first translator of the JTDL (into Japanese), does not explain the term jiā. The revised edition of his translation has a note to this passage in which Mizuno’s Bukkyō no Shinshikiron is cited in order to explain the term bhavaṅga (Hikata 1978 [1933], 217, n. 134). However, there is no explicit understanding of jiā in Hikata’s translation since he just prints the Chinese character 夹 without any additional explanation.

Naniwa, the most recent translator of the JTDL, understands jiā-shèng (夾勝) as a translation of the Pāli term, vīthi-bheda, ‘breaking of the process’ (Naniwa 2001, 233, note. 7). It seems that he takes jiā as vīthi, and shèng as bheda. (It is unclear why he brings in the word bheda here since there is no further explanation of it.) Then he translates sentence 9於意門無事夹 as ‘There is no jiā for an object at the mind-organ (意門に於ては事の夹無し[なし])’ which is exactly the same as the earlier translation by Hikata (Hikata 1978 [1933], 219; Naniwa 2001, 236). As I shall explain below, their understanding is problematic.

In fact, Mizuno had already assumed that the Chinese term jiā was a translation of the Pāli term vīthi, namely, ‘the [cognitive] process’ (on this translation and understanding, see Bodhi 2010, 151), some time before Naniwa’s translation was published (Mizuno 1978[1964], 887). Using this assumption, Mizuno produced his own translation of a carefully selected part of the passage on the cognitive process from the JTDL, namely from 449b5 to 449b17. This passage, however, covers only five (2–6) of the ten occurrences of jiā listed above. Close examination shows that his understanding of jiā is only viable in this selected passage. The term jiā cannot be understood in this way because of sentence 9. If the term jiā corresponds to vīthi or the cognitive process, the translation adopted by these Japanese translators implies that there is no vīthi at the mind organ. This understanding would therefore necessarily result in denying all cognitive processes which occur at the mind organ.
As I understand the doctrine concerning the cognitive process in the JTDL so far, there is no concept such as citta-vīthi which includes the whole cognitive process at the six sense organs. As already mentioned, the term shèng-xīn just implies the active mind-moments, namely, consciousnesses in the process (vīthi-citta), rather than the cognitive process as a whole (citta-vīthi). Therefore, I propose that the ‘closest’ Pāli correspondence for jiā in the later Pāli abhidhamma, is visayappavatti rather than vīthī.10

However, while the Pāli term visayappavatti relates to not only the five material sense organs but also the mind-organ, the term jiā relates to the five material sense organs. According to the Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha, the visayappavatti can have six kinds of cognitive intensity at the six sense organs, namely four kinds of intensity at the five material sense organs, and two kinds at the mind-organ: the first varies from very great to very slight, and the second from clear to unclear.11 Here the Pāli technical term visayappavatti refers to the mind’s initial apprehension of an object.

The compound visayappavatti can be analysed as two words, visaya and pavatti. For visaya, the Pāli-English Dictionary defines its Sanskrit form as viśaya (PED, 639). This seems to be a typographic error, however. If it were the case, the Pāli term visaya would mean ‘being doubtful’ because the Sanskrit term viśaya is derived from the root vi+√śī, which means ‘to be subject to doubt’ (MWD, 991). Therefore, the Sanskrit form must be viṣaya, meaning ‘an object’, from the root √viṣ (MWD, 997; Apte, 1476; 1477–1478). The latter term of the compound is a feminine noun, pavatti. The Sanskrit form is pravṛtti, derived from pra+√vṛt, which means ‘to proceed’, ‘spring’, ‘take place’, ‘exert oneself’, ‘be occupied with’ and so on. From these root meanings, the term pravṛtti comes to mean ‘a manifestation’, ‘execution’, ‘happening’ and so on (MWD, 693; Apte, 1110–1111). From these two terms, the compound visayappavatti refers to an object (visaya) appearing (pavatti) at the six sense organs. Therefore, Bodhi translates it as ‘presentation of objects’ (Bodhi 2010, 153), and Karunadasa explains it as ‘a process having reference to an object’ (Karunadasa 2014, 140).

The Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha suggests four other alternative terms for a cognitive object, namely ārammaṇa, ārambaṇa, ālambaṇa and gocara. All of them refer to

---

10. Here, the term paṭigha-samphassa might be considered the Pāli correspondence for jiā. According to the Nikāyas (Dīgha Nikāya II, 62; Majjhima Nikāya I, 111 etc.), phassa is the meeting of sense-organ, its object and consciousness, and has two aspects, namely, adhivacana-samphassa and paṭigha-samphassa. Peter Harvey translates them as ‘designative-stimulation’ and ‘impact-stimulation’ respectively (Harvey 1995, 133). Among them, the latter stimulation, paṭigha-samphassa, depends on the physical body which corresponds to the term jiā. Furthermore, the Visuddhimagga uses similar terms in order to explain the arising of the cognitive process through the five material sense organs, for example, paṭigha (X.12), abhighāta (XIV.37) and phassa (XIV.134). Especially, the explanation of phassa (XIV.134) is perfectly applicable to the cognitive process through the six sense organs. Nevertheless, the JTDL has correspondences for these terms, such as 有對 (420c26; 445c26) for paṭigha and abhighāta, and 触 (447c10) for phassa. Therefore, it is obvious that these terms cannot be the correspondence for jiā.

11. Abhidhammattha Sangaha 4.5: atimahanta mahantaṃ parittam atiparittaṃ cā ti paiccadvāre, manodvāre pana vibhūtānaṃ vibhūtānaṃ cā ti chadhā visayappavatti veditabbo; ‘The six kinds of presentation of object should be understood as the very great, the great, the slight, and the very slight at the five doors, and the clear and unclear at the mind-door’ (Wijeratne and Gethin 2002, 120).
objects capable of stimulating the six sense organs, as does visaya (Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha 3.16). In the case of JTDL, the term shì (事) corresponds to the five Pāli terms above since the term covers objects which are material, mental or not only material but also mental.

Therefore, the meaning of the term jiā in the JTDL is quite similar to the Pāli term visayappavatti in the Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha. Both of them refer to the initial cognitive activity which initiates very similar kinds of cognitive events from the non-active state (bhavaṅga). Here, we may notice that the two texts share the close perspectives of abhidhamma, especially the concept of bhavaṅga. In other words, the two terms are discussed based on the concept of bhavaṅga in the two different texts.

However, there is a crucial difference between the two terms. While the Pāli term visayappavatti means the initial cognitive activity by any of those six organs, the term jiā means the initial cognitive activity by any of the five material sense organs, but not by the mind-organ. In other words, the term jiā does not include a cognitive activity at the mind-organ. It is clearly verified from the sentence ‘There is no jiā at the mind-organ’. The term jiā refers only to the initial cognitive activity by the five material sense organs, and has nothing to do with the mind-organ.

The differences between jiā and visayappavatti suggest that the term jiā is a less developed abhidhamma term compared to the term visayappavatti. That visayappavatti covers two areas of activity (namely the material sense organs and the mind-organ) does not in and of itself constitute greater maturity than covering just one topic (the material sense organs). It can only be judged so if this double function better serves the needs of its subject than the single one.

Given that the term ‘mature’ can be defined as ‘having reached the most advanced stage in a process’ (OED), however, we should note that the term jiā is used in the opening sentence that sets the topic for this whole section in the JTDL. As we have seen above, the section on cognitive process begins with the question, ‘How do the active mind-moments occur in terms of jiā (問云何以夾勝心起)’? This designates the topic of this section. The discussion that follows is divided into two sub-topics which we are justified in assuming would both be concerned with jiā. The first is the cognitive process arising from stimulation of the five material sense organs, and the second sub-topic is the cognitive process from the mind-organ. The topic sentence of the JTDL, however, relates only to the first sub-topic. The second sub-topic is irrelevant to the section because the

12. Among them, in fact, the term gocara is quite problematic. It is derived from ‘a moving (चर) cow (को)', and generally means ‘pasture ground for cattle’, ‘accessible’, ‘anything perceptible by the senses’ and so on (MWD, 364; Apte, 671). As an abhidhamma term, gocara seems to refer only to those material objects capable of stimulating the five sense doors, namely visible form, sound, smell, taste and tangible in the Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha (4.6; 6.3). Indeed, the term gocara is mentioned in the sentence which describes one of the four intensities at the five material organs (ālambanam etam atimahantaṃ nāma gocaram. Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha 4.6). However, in the sentences referring to the other three intensities at the five material organs, namely mahanta, paritta and atiparitta, the term gocara is not found. It needs more research to determine whether this is a simple abbreviation or that gocara is denied in the other cases. Furthermore, the term gocara includes the mental objects in other texts, for example, Nāmarūpapariccheda (238), and Saccasankhepa (123). My thanks to Lance Cousins for informing me of these two references for the term ‘gocara’ when I gave a talk at King’s College London on 20th June 2014.
Observations on Some Technical Terms in the *Vimuttimagga

Observations on Some Technical Terms in the *Vimuttimagga

term jiā only relates to the five material sense organs. Despite this anomaly, the cognitive process section still rounds off this whole discussion with the sentence, ‘This is how occurrence of the active mind-moments in terms of jiā should be understood (如是彼夾勝心起可知).’

As the stated topic of this section, the term jiā should have been related to both of its sub-topics. The JTDL, however, seemingly does not have a single technical term for describing an initial cognitive activity through any of the six sense organs. In the Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha, however, there is a developed technical term which describes the initial apprehension of an object not only by the five material sense organs, but also in the mind-organ, i.e. visayappavatti. By use of the term visayappavatti, the Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha can discuss the whole section under the same topic heading. This implies that jiā is a less mature, namely, less functional, abhidhamma technical term in this context than visayappavatti is in the later Pāli treatises.

Nevertheless, we should not overlook the similarities between the two terms. As mentioned above, the two terms share similar structures, approaches and technical terms for describing the cognitive process which is based on the concept of bhavaṅga. Given that the concept of bhavaṅga is universally understood to be a distinctive doctrine of Sri Lankan Theravāda, the discussion of the cognitive process in the JTDL suggests its close relationship with the Sri Lankan tradition, even if it was not written in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, the similarities between the JTDL and the Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha suggest that the JTDL was very close to the Mahāvihāra fraternity rather than other fraternities in Sri Lanka. The later Pāli treatise Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha was strongly based on the Mahāvihāra tradition. Nevertheless, we can find the similarities between JTDL and Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha. It implies that JTDL represents the early phase of the Mahāvihāra tradition.

Conclusion

This article has investigated the abhidhamma terminology of the cognitive process discussed in the JTDL. To sum up, we now have the following understanding of the abhidhamma technical term, jiā (夾), the meaning of which was uncertain or misunderstood in The Path of Freedom, the English translation published in 1961.

The word generally means ‘catch’, ‘seize’ and ‘hold’ in other Chinese texts. In the JTDL, as an abhidhamma term, jiā implies an initial cognitive activity through the five material sense organs, but not at the mind-organ. Its meaning is not revealed clearly in the published English translation.

Jiā and visayappavatti have quite similar functions as abhidhamma technical terms. Both of them are the main cause for the arising of the active mind-moments from a non-active state which is called the state of bhavaṅga (yŏufēn-xīn) in the JTDL and Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha. Even though there is huge chronological distance between the two treatises, they are based on the same doctrinal structure, approach and technical terms. We have, however, also found fundamental differences here. The term jiā is defined as an initial cognitive activity through the five material sense organs, not a mind-organ. It is discussed only in reference to the five material sense organs, and the term is abandoned in discussions related to the mind-organ. The term visayappavatti, on the other hand, refers to the initial cognitive activity by the all of six sense organs. The differences between these
two terms imply that the term jiā is a less developed abhidhamma term than visayappavatti. The reason for this conclusion is that the term jiā cannot cover its two sub-topics as a topic key word. It is not fully functional in its given context.

The conclusions from our research are as follows. Firstly, we can now define the term jiā clearly. It means an initial cognitive activity through the five material sense organs. Secondly, more of the doctrinal context of the mysterious text JTDL is revealed. The similarities between the two terms, namely jiā and visayappavatti suggest that this text was actually very close to the Mahāvihāra tradition. Indeed, discussion of the cognitive process based on the concept of bhavaṅga is only found in the extant Pāli texts, which are transmitted solely by the Mahāvihāra tradition. Furthermore, the differences between the two terms discussed here establish that the term jiā is less developed conceptually than visayappavatti. It implies that the JTDL is a less mature abhidhamma treatise which represents an earlier phase of thought than the later Pāli texts. Therefore, these similarities and differences strongly suggest that the JTDL could easily be an earlier text of the Mahāvihāra tradition rather than a text of a non-Mahāvihāra one. If this text is to be attributed to a rival of the Mahāvihāra in Sri Lanka, the rival has still to be quite close to the Mahāvihāra, or at least share its abhidhamma perspectives.

Abbreviations

OED  Oxford English Dictionary.
T  Taishō shinshū daizōkyō 大正新修大藏經.

Bibliography

T 31. 《法界阿含》(JTDL, *Vimuttimagga)
Observations on Some Technical Terms in the *Vimuttimagga*


———. 2005. ‘The Vimuttimagga and Early Post-Canonical Literature (3)’. *Bukeyō kenyū* 34: 5–33.


