Mind-Independent Values Don’t Exist, But Moral Truth Does
Abstract
Download Media
PDF
DOI: 10.1558/eph.33214
References
Anderson, Elizabeth. 2014. “Dewey’s Moral Philosophy.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2014 Edition, edited by Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/dewey-moral/
Asay, Jamin. 2012. “A Truthmaking Account of Realism and Anti-Realism.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93: 373-394. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01431.x
———. 2013. “Truthmaking, Metaethics and Creeping Minimalism.” Philosophical Studies 163: 213–232.
Barber, Alex. “Science’s Immunity to Moral Refutation.” Australian Journal of Philosophy 91: 633‒653. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2013.768279
Blackburn, Simon. 1998. Ruling Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 1999. “Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-Realist Foundation?” Inquiry 42: 213‒227. https://doi.org/10.1080/002017499321552
Burgess, John. P. 2010. “Against Ethics.” In A World Without Values, edited by Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin, 1‒15. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
Campbell, Richmond. 2015. “Moral Epistemology.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2015 Edition, edited by Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/moral-epistemology/
Campbell, Richmond and Kumar, Victor. 2013. “Pragmatic Naturalism and Moral Objectivity.” Analysis 73: 446‒455. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ant058
Dewey, John. 1975 [1891]. “Moral Theory and Practice.” In The Early Works, Volume 3, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, 93‒109. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
———. 2004 [1916]. Essays in Experimental Logic. New York: Dover.
———. 1983 [1922]. “Valuation and Experimental Knowlegde.” In The Middle Works Volume 13, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, 3‒28. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
———. 1923. Human Nature and Conduct. New York: Henry Holt & Company.
———. 1925/1984. “Value, Objective Reference, and Criticism.” In The Later Works , Volume 2, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, 78‒97. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
———. 1929. The Quest for Certainty. New York: Minton, Balch & Company.
———. 1938/1982. Logic, the Theory of Inquiry. New York: Irvington.
———. 1939/1988. “Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder.” In The Later Works, Volume 14, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, 3‒90. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
———. 1988 [1939]. “Theory of Valuation.” In The Later Works, Volume 13, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, 189‒252. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
Dewey, John. 1989 [1943]. “Valuation Judgments and Immediate Quality.” In The Later Works, Volume 15, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, 63‒72. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
Diggins, John. 1994. The Promise of Pragmatism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Faraci, David. 2015. “A Hard Look at Moral Perception”. Philosophical Studies 172: 2055‒2072. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0397-6
Garner, Richard. 2010. “Abolishing Morality.” In A World Without Values, edited by Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin, 217‒233. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0_13
Haidt, Jonathan. 2001. “The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.” Psychological Review 108: 813‒834. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.108.4.814
———. 2010. “Moral Psychology Must Not Be Based on Faith and Hope: Commentary on Narvaez (2010).” Perspectives on Psychological Science 5: 182‒184. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691610362352
———. 2013. The Righteous Mind. New York: Vintage.
Haidt, Jonathan, and Joseph, Craig. 2008. “The Moral Mind.” In The Innate Mind, Volume 3, edited by Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence and Stephen Stick, 367–392. New York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195332834.003.0019
Haidt, Jonathan, and Bjorklund, Fredrik. 2007. “Social Intuitionists Answer Six Questions About Morality.” In Moral Psychology, Volume 2, The Cognitive Science of Morality, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, 181‒217. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
Husi, Stan. 2014. “Against Moral Fictionalism.” Journal of Moral Philosophy 11: 80‒96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681008
Joyce, Richard. 2001. The Myth of Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487101
———. 2005. “Moral Fictionalism.” In Fictionalism in Metaphysics, edited by Mark Kalderon, 287‒313. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 2006. The Evolution of Morality. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
———. 2008. “Morality, Schmorality.” In Morality and Self-Interest, edited by Paul Bloomfield, 51‒75. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Joyce, Richard and Simon Kirchin. 2010. “Introduction.” In A World Without Values, edited by Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin, ix-xxiv. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0
Kahane, Guy. 2011. “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.” NOÛS 45: 103‒125. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00770.x
Kirchin, Simon. 2010. “A Tension in the Moral Error Theory.” In A World Without Values, edited by Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin, 167‒182. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0_10
Kitcher, Philip. 2011. The Ethical Project. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674063075
LaFolette, Hugh. 2000.“Pragmatic Ethics.” In Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, edited by Hugh LaFolette, 400‒419. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lillehammer, Hallvard. 2004. “Moral Error Theory.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104: 95–111. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00083.x
Lutz, Matthew. 2014. “The ‘What Now’ Problem for Error Theory.” Philosophical Studies 171: 351‒371. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0275-7
Mackie, John L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
McCarthy, Christine. 1999. “Dewey’s Ethics: Philosophy or Science?” Educational Theory 49: 339‒358. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5446.1999.00339.x
Morton, Adam. 2003. The Importance of Being Understood. New York: Routledge.
McGrath, Sarah. 2011. “Skepticism about Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism.” Journal of Philosophy 108: 111‒137. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil201110837
Nagel, Thomas. 1986. The View From Nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press.
Navarez, Darcia. 2010. “Moral Complexity: The Fatal Attraction of Truthiness and the Importance of Mature Moral Functioning.” Perspectives on Psychological Science 5: 163‒181. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691610362351
Nichols, Shuan. 2004. Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0195169344.001.0001
Nolan, Daniel, Greg Restall, and Caroline West. 2005. “Moral Fictionalism Versus the Rest.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83: 307–330. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400500191917
Olson, Jonas. 2014. Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198701934.001.0001
Prinz, Jesse. 2006. “The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments.” Philosophical Explorations 9: 29‒43. https://doi.org/10.1080/13869790500492466
Rawls, John B. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Richardson, Henry S. 1998. “Truth and Ends in Dewey’s Pragmatism.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28: 109‒147. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1998.10717497
Sauer, Hanno. Forthcoming. “No Excuses for Moral Realism.” Unpublished Manuscript.
Svoboda, Toby. 2015. “Why Moral Error Theorists Should Become Revisionary Moral Expressivists.” Journal of Moral Philosophy 1: 1‒25. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-46810047
Warnock, Geoffrey J. 1971. The Object of Morality. London: Methuen.
West, Caroline. 2010. “Business As Usual? The Error Theory, Internalism, and the Function of Morality.” In A World Without Values edited by Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin, 183‒198. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0_11
Williams, Bernard A. O. 1981. Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139165860
———. 2004. Truth and Truthfulness. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Refbacks
- There are currently no refbacks.