Book reviews


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John Gibbons’ *Forensic Linguistics: An Introduction to Language in the Justice System* is the most recent book-length publication in English on the topic of language and law. The subtitle more accurately conveys the book’s contents, for the book covers a fairly wide range of topics, and it does give attention to such introductory matters as the language of the law and the general role of language in the judicial process. It is, in fact, the most comprehensive book to date with respect to language and the law. Its primary title is somewhat misleading, though, for the book does not cover the full range of topics included in forensic linguistics. Missing completely, for instance, are such topics as trademark, deceptive trade practice, discrimination, the adequacy of warnings (other than Miranda and similar warnings or cautions), and fraud issues. Overall, however, it clearly ranks with McMenamin 2002 as a good introductory book on the general topic of language and law. McMenamin’s book, *Forensic Linguistics: Advances in Forensic Stylistics*, provides an introduction to the field and addresses both the function of linguist-witnesses and methods of analysis for document examiners, partly by examining such matters as Ted Kaczynski’s manifesto, the JonBenét Ramsey ransom note, and anthrax letters. Like Gibbons (2003), it covers only some of the topics of forensic linguistics.

Comprehensiveness – or the lack thereof – is always an issue in a developing field, of course. Right now, it is controversial among scholars whether any book should carry the title *Forensic Linguistics*. It has emerged as the most widely used term for the application of linguistic
analysis to issues in the legal process, and some feel that books that focus on only some aspects of forensic linguistics should reflect their narrowness of coverage in the primary title.

Forensic linguistics has been emerging as a field in its own right only since the late 1980s. Earlier books (Philbrick 1951, Mellinkoff 1963) were limited to a discussion of legal language. The first books about forensic linguistics as the term is used today were published in 1990 (Levi and Walker; Kniffka (partly in English); and Rieber and Stewart). Before that, the only books on the topic were those by O’Barr (1982) and others on courtroom discourse and Kurzon’s (1986) book on legal speech acts.

Then, between 1993 and 2003, another dozen or so books were published, most of them focusing on one particular aspect of forensic linguistics. The earliest of these were Shuy’s first book on the subject, *Language Crimes* (1993), Solan’s *The Language of Judges* (1993), Gibbons’ edited collection *Language and the Law* (1994), and Stygall’s *Trial Language* (1994). Later came Eades (1995) (language issues in multicultural Australia), Engberg and Trosbert (1997) (a multilingual collection of papers on issues faced by lawyers and linguists) and Tiersma (1999) (a textbook on legal language), as well as three additional books by Shuy (1998a, 1998b, 2002), and McMenamin (1993). These books pretty much focus on one particular aspect of language and law. One other recent volume, an edited collection, deserves mention also – Cotterill (2002) – which is broader in its coverage. Finally, one additional book has been announced, Olsson (2004).

Important as each of these books is in its own right, the most useful books as introductory textbooks are McMenamin 2002, and this new book by Gibbons. Of course their excellence is in part a tribute to the quality of the work in forensic linguistics that has gone on since the late 1980s and that is reflected in the other works listed here. Gibbons draws heavily on the works of many linguists.

Overall, the book has many strengths. It is ideal for students in classes in language and law. Its breadth of coverage of topics and its references to other studies make it ideal for use in both undergraduate and postgraduate courses. The author includes in his Introduction and other chapters enough information about his conceptual frameworks that readers can familiarize themselves with aspects of such topics as discourse analysis and pragmatics even as they read descriptions and case studies involving legal contexts and legal scenarios.

He begins with an Introduction that contains an overview of law as an institution and language as the most important medium through which legal processes are enacted. He briefly describes various legal systems, though he concentrates on common law, that of the adversarial systems of the UK and the US.

He then explores characteristics of the language of law itself in Chapter 1, Literacy and the Law, being careful to distinguish between written/
codified language and language of the courtroom. He acknowledges briefly both the role of literacy and the importance of technology.

Following are chapters on The Pursuit of Precision in legal language (2), patterns of Interaction and Power in the courtroom (3), and strategies for successful narration – Telling the Story (4). All these chapters contain both theoretical background information and case studies, most from Gibbons’ own research. Chapter 2 explores the roles of vocabulary items (‘words’), grammar, speech acts, discourse, interpretation, and ‘knowledge issues’ (‘discourse frames’). Chapter 3 contains detailed discussion of interaction and power issues, focusing heavily on interaction patterns, non-verbal communication, coercive strategies and pragmatic strategies for constructing and affirming selected versions of events. Chapter 4 on narration explores both the nature of the genre and issues in reconstructions of primary reality.

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 address issues of linguistic performance and inequality in legal systems, beginning with a look at Communication Issues in the Legal System (5), then moving on to Language and Disadvantage before the Law (6), and Bridging the Gap (7). The major contribution of these chapters is recognition of (1) the two-audience dilemma (much trial language must be addressed simultaneously to both lay and legal audiences) and (2) the need to reduce communication problems in the courtroom at a number of points during the trial process. Chapter 5 contains a fairly detailed discussion of issues in jury instruction comprehension, especially as they were identified in the pioneering research of Charrow and Charrow (1979).

The chapter on Law on Language (8) focuses briefly on such matters as language planning, language rights, illegal speech (perjury), language crimes, the right to silence, and vilification, including group vilification.

The final chapter, that on Linguistic Evidence (9), addresses the broad topic of linguistic evidence: its ethic, its admissibility, its validity, and its reliability. Obviously, it does not go into detail about all levels of linguistic analysis, but it does introduce the student to a few of the issues implicit in linguistic evidence.

Overall, the book benefits greatly from the extensive courtroom experience of the author. Its weaknesses arise from the fact that a one-volume book simply cannot include all topics implicit in forensic linguistics today. A longer volume would include those topics mentioned earlier. It might also address issues of interpreting and translation at greater length, perhaps listing some of the professional organizations such as the National Association of Judiciary Interpreters and Translators – as well as other professional organizations.

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Review 79: 1306–74.


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Reviewing in English a book written in French on English legal language is unquestionably a challenge. Anne Wagner claims in her introduction that the purpose of her book is to suggest a ‘re-ordering’ (‘réaménagement’) of the relationship between the English language (as a general language) and legal language (as a ‘specialized language’ or ‘language for special purposes’). She admits from the start (page 9) that her research ‘is based upon the hypothesis that the teaching of the English language applied to the law can reach a certain degree of coherence’ if ‘specific’ attention is paid both to its legal and linguistic dimensions.

Part I of the book, ‘The Elaboration and the Evolution of the Discourse of the Common Law’, is dedicated to a review of ‘the crossover of meanings’ (‘croisement de sens’) (10) in the fields of law and linguistics. The author’s purpose is to demonstrate the contribution of ‘history, civilization and etymology’ (10) to the formation of English legal ‘discourse’.

In Chapter 1, ‘The Contribution of Linguistics’, Wagner presents a ‘communication scheme’ in which she analyses the ‘utterer/utterance’ relationship and ‘the construction of reference sets’ (‘ensembles de reference’). In other words, she examines ‘the relationship between the general language and the legal language’ (27), which she regards as both a ‘language within a language’ (29) and as an ‘act of writing’ (31). ‘The law has at its disposal the general language which it adapts by adding characteristics that are specific to English law’ (30).

One would expect at this stage that the rest of the book be dedicated to the identification of these ‘specific characteristics’. But what comes next leaves the reader rather unsatisfied.

Indeed, the author undertakes to analyse the ‘contribution of semiotics to legal science’. The language of the Common Law is a ‘metalanguage’ which originates from a ‘specific linguistic community’ (37). It is, according to Greimas, a ‘secondary semiotic system’ rooted in ‘natural language’. It has ‘closed structure’ (Malloy in Kevelson 1992), which makes it possible to find a ‘recurrent structure’ to analyse legal ‘meaning and logic’ (41). The Greimasian approach – which she seems to favour – leads her to suggest the elaboration of a ‘lexicon of the legal discourse’. But, somewhat confusingly, the author also sums up Peirce’s approach to legal language (he ‘asserts the absolute necessity […] to synthesize the values shared by the individual and the community’ in order to understand ‘legal reasoning’ (47), and mentions, in a rather disorderly way, Austin’s ‘speech act theory’, Wittgenstein’s approach of the ‘intimate experimental act’ (49), Friedman’s ‘process of organization’ as expounded in The Legal System (1975) (53), Hart’s conception of ‘ascriptivism’ (54) and Kelsen’s approach, which is ‘complementary to that of Austin’ (56).
Without any transition, the author then proceeds to an appraisal of ‘the creation of a legal language system’ (‘système langagier juridique’) (59). She wants to explore how the ‘common language’ evolved into a ‘specialized language’ (60). To this end, she examines the ‘influence of history on the language of the Common Law’, that is, ‘the emergence of specific discourses’ (61–116) due to ‘successive invasions’ (62–7), but also – with some lack of congruency – the ‘etymological analysis of the discourse of the Common Law’ (67–79). She then goes on to examine ‘the evolution of English law’ (79) through its ‘historical sources’ (79–92) and asserts ‘the emergence of an organized product’ (92–116), where she evokes – again – the ‘sources’ of the Common Law, but also recalls the main rules of statutory interpretation before examining – again with some lack of consistency – the ‘system of abbreviations’ generally adopted in the Law Reports (112–13).

In a section on ‘Specialized Language, Language of the Technician’ (117), the author aims to ‘understand the mechanisms which lead to a distortion of meaning between legal discourse […] and the common language’. She seeks to demonstrate ‘the importance of the relationship between meaning and the communicative function’ (119). She describes the hierarchy of courts in England and comes to the conclusion that ‘the mastery of legal discourse requires of necessity the conceptualisation of the meaning given by English law to words or sentences used’ by these various institutions (126). In this attempt, she examines (surprisingly again) sets of abbreviations (for example Q.B.D. for Queen’s Bench Division) and names given to judges depending on their position in the hierarchy of courts (Your Honour, My Lord), summarizing incidentally the functions and powers of each one. The author then seeks to identify ‘specific markers’ of legal language (133). She stresses very strongly the fact that a ‘verdict’ is not a ‘judgment’, and describes at length the difference between a ‘defendant’, an ‘accused’ and a ‘plaintiff’. She then analyses the ‘difficulties of the language of the Common Law’ (135), mentioning in this respect, with no explanation whatsoever, Wittgenstein’s theory of language games and Fish’s ‘institutional practices of the interpretative community’ (135). The claim arising from this analysis is rather meagre – no-one would dispute that ‘legal meaning varies according to time, space and social organisation’ (135). She adds that legal terminology may vary, but that ‘definitions’ play an important role in circumscribing the meaning of a word specific to a certain ‘linguistic community’. Finally, she raises the problem of translation. In her opinion, the difference between the French and English ‘linguistic communities’ impedes, in most cases, translation of legal terms from one language into the other. As she has set forth already in the Introduction, the ‘linguistic and historical environments’ (10) are the only means of determining whether French and English legal concepts are ‘equivalent’. She asserts, rather than demonstrates, that many of the
latter can only be translated by means of ‘paraphrases’ (11) because legal English and legal French ‘have no common yardstick’ (149).


She first discusses ‘l’aménagement linguistique’, that is, ‘language planning’ or, perhaps more appropriately in Wagner’s understanding of the expression, the ‘re-ordering of legal language’. More precisely, she examines the ‘practical contribution’ of ‘discursive productions’ (11). Indeed, her approach to legal discourse is much more technical in this instance: under the ‘contribution of terminology’, she discusses the meaning of ‘free pardon’ (161) and, rather surprisingly, that of ‘silk gown’, but also that of ‘leapfrog procedure’ and ‘to file a petition for divorce’. Various ‘compounds’ are described and examples are given (Noun + Noun, Compound Noun + Date): the meaning of ‘dwelling-house’ is discussed at length (172–4). ‘Latin codification’ (175–82) is also given some attention, as well as ‘self-referential terms’ (182–85) such as ‘chapters, sections, sub-sections etc… of statutes’. Derivation schemes are described (185–90) as well. However, under ‘Terminology’, she also examines ‘micro-sequences’ (‘micro-enchaînements’) (190–99), that is, ‘transitional and connective expression’, ‘anaphoric markers’, ‘cataphoric markers’, ‘argumentative signals’, as well as ‘time’ and ‘spatial markers’.

The following chapter is devoted to ‘specialised utterances’ (‘spécificités énonciatives’) (203), that is, mainly to the study of sentences (as opposed to words) which are specific to English legal language. In a section on ‘Anchoring of the Enunciation’, she examines ‘markers of modal logic’ and ‘modal auxiliaries’ (may, might, must, can, could, shall and will) as well as ‘performative acts’. In another, ‘The Macro-structure of the Language’, she undertakes to study the ‘syntactic complexity’ of legal language, taking the example given by Jackson (1995: 31–3) – ‘This agreement, unless it is terminated earlier, will expire on November 1 1993’ – and the ‘relations between sentences’ as illustrated by Kevelson (1992: 488).

The author then turns to ‘The Linguistic Identification of Processes of Fluidity and Rigidity’, analysing ‘terms with a loose (uncertain?) notional domain’ and ‘fuzzy concepts’ (the difference between the two is unclear). She deals here with ‘le processus de traitement des données’ (the phrase is unclear, even in French). In short, she discusses the meaning of it in the phrase ‘it is declared that…’ or ‘it is said to be…’; that of no in ‘no person shall…’; and of any in the phrase ‘any person against whom…’. She also analyses a few adjectives such as reasonable or sufficient, connectors such as and or (citing Mellinkoff 1963: 55–6), and words relating to time, such as time, month and period. She concludes by asserting that legal discourse is ‘an organized rhetorical product’ (285) which can be analysed on the basis of three registers: the ‘prescriptive register’ (287), the ‘descriptive
register’ (289) and the ‘explicative register’ (290). In a section on ‘The Legal Intelligence’ (‘L’intelligence juridique’), she makes an ‘inventory of the main linguistic mechanisms which can lead to the understanding of normative productions’ (296). She asserts that legal language belongs to a ‘legal class’ (what is meant by this is, again, unclear) and that there exists a (specific?) perception of the ‘linguistic know-how applied to the law’ (‘savoir faire jurilinguistique’).

The Conclusion fails to respond to the problem raised in the Introduction. The author simply reasserts that a dual approach – both legal and linguistic – to the language of the Common Law is needed to understand and master ‘English legal discourse’ and suggests that, using this approach, she has ‘clearly’ defined ‘English legal logic’ (321). She asserts the existence of a ‘specific legal terminology’ and concludes that ‘social dynamics has an influence on legal language’ (322).

One cannot dispute the statement that ‘legal discourse is a complex art’, as stated at the end of the book (322). Yet ‘art’ encompasses many mysteries, and these mysteries remain after reading Anne Wagner’s book.

One may ask from the start whether the discussion concerning the ‘re-ordering of legal language’ with regard to general language is not somewhat outdated. This issue – whether in England, the United States or France – is seldom discussed today. There is no doubt that ‘legal language’ is regarded as ‘specialized language’ – or a ‘sublanguage’ (Tiersma 1999: 143) – whether it be French or English. Other issues of greater importance are debated today, namely the means (versus the possibility) to draw a boundary between general language and legal language on the one hand, and between legal language and other specialized languages on the other. Polysemy (internal and external) is a topic on which much remains to be said – especially in view of the extensive research undertaken, notably in France, on Law and Natural Language Processing (see Chodkiewicz and Gross 2004 for a summary of findings) – but not one word is said on this topic in this book.

Furthermore, Anne Wagner’s approach to English ‘legal discourse’ is unclear. First of all, the term ‘discourse’ is not defined at any point in the book, and is not even included in the Glossary (323–7) at the end. This lack of definition is most unfortunate, all the more so as she quotes throughout the book authors who come from very different linguistic ‘schools’, without ever discussing the pertinence of their theories for the purpose of her ‘demonstration’. Greimas and Austin are sometimes cited on the same page, or even in the same paragraph, without mentioning the theoretical background of their approaches and, a fortiori, the practical consequences which they entail. In addition, Anne Wagner often cites French legal scholars (especially Gény, sometimes at great length) without ever raising the question whether their approach to French legal language (which is no doubt dictated by their approach to the French legal system)
can be transposed when analysing English legal ‘language’ and/or ‘dis-
course’. Too many quotations – not always à propos and often too vague –
distract the reader, making the ‘demonstration’ even more opaque.

La Langue de la Common Law is clearly too ambitious: the author
evokes ‘tracks’ of research which are not pursued (namely the ‘logical
approach’ to English legal language). At the same time, her conclusion is
very vague: who would today question the fact that there exists a specific
‘legal terminology’ (whatever the language – English, French or Zulu for
that matter) and that, at the end of the day, in order to analyse ‘legal dis-
course’ one has to consider many ‘sociolinguistic’ factors? Furthermore,
the choice of words made by the author to support her ‘demonstration’
suggests that her comprehension of English law is somewhat superficial.
Indeed, she sums up the history of the Common Law, describes the hier-
archy of courts in England, mentions a few rules of statutory
interpretation (all of which are well known to French legal scholars, and
taught today in most Faculties of Law throughout France), and indicates in
passing the exact meaning of abbreviations used in the Law Reports (a
minor issue with regard to the aim set forth in the Introduction). But she
fails to clearly identify the specific features of English legal ‘language’
and/or ‘discourse’. This is all the more unfortunate in that, as noted above,
she makes the hypothesis that French and English ‘languages’ and/or ‘dis-
courses’ have no common features. Yet Malcolm Harvey (1997) has clearly
shown that the comparison of these two legal languages is not only pos-
sible, but enriching in many respects insofar as the epistemological limits
of the endeavour are clearly circumscribed from the start.

Anne Wagner’s bibliography is incomplete, which may explain why she
has omitted important issues relating to her theme of research. She seems
to ignore Malcolm Harvey’s research, but also that of other French and
Canadian scholars: Emmanuel Didier (1990), whose work has had a wide
echo not only in France but also in Canada, and that of Jean-Claude
Gémar (Gémar 1982; Gémar and Kasirer 2004), whose research in the
field of legal translation is known world-wide. Furthermore, the one
important French book on ‘legal linguistics’ – Gérard Cornu’s Linguistique
juridique (2000) – is mentioned in its first edition of 1990 rather than in its
second and considerably revised edition of 2000. Wagner’s English bibli-
ography is also very incomplete. No mention, for instance, is made of
Peter Tiersma’s Legal Language (1999) or of Peter Goodrich’s Legal Dis-
course (1987), which is unfortunate.

Nevertheless, what is more difficult to understand is that not one word
is said of the research undertaken some 25 years ago, and still pursued by
Canadian scholars, on the Common Law in French. Wagner’s position on
translation is in total contradiction with that of Canadian researchers –
especially that of Gérard Snow and his ‘team’ at the University of
Moncton (see Snow and Vanderlinden 1995). Canadian researchers have
demonstrated the possibility, even the necessity, of studying and teaching the Common Law in French in a country where two languages and two different legal systems have to cohabit (which makes some Canadians say that they have, in fact, four legal languages). Even articles in English have been published on the subject (for example Cantlie 1989).

In summary, after Anne Wagner, much still remains to be said in French on ‘The (English) Language of the Common Law’, despite knowing that a good deal has already been said by a number of researchers of great renown in Canada, Switzerland, France and Belgium, but whose work is perhaps unjustly unknown amongst scholars who, in England and the United States, study the English language of the Common Law in English.

NOTE
1 The term jurilinguistique is used in Canada, whereas linguistique juridique is preferred in France, but the two expressions are synonymous and designate ‘the study of the language of the law’ (l’étude du langage du droit’), as recalled again by Gérard Cornu in the Dictionnaire de la culture juridique (2003).

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One of the most troublesome problems faced by separate disciplines, such as linguistics and law, is that interaction among such fields is maddeningly difficult. We do not share the same ideologies, beliefs and knowledge. Since language is a crucial part of every known part of human life, including even mathematics and music, applied linguists have struggled with such differences, especially in medical communication, education, law, and in every other field where we have tried to show how language works. But there usually comes a time when specialists in the target field tell us, with painful accuracy, where we went wrong or missed the mark.

I am rather pleased that the attorney/reviewer of my book found anything good about it. I am also pleased that she appreciates how difficult it is to bring the fields a bit closer in their knowledge of each other and that my effort was ‘a first step in opening the dialogue between lawyers and linguists’, which, of course, was my purpose in writing it. Furthermore, I am grateful for her corrections to my inaccurate portrayal of the use of the subscript TM and encircled R as well as my inaccurate depiction of Chap Stick as merely descriptive (I should have said merely suggestive, as McCarthy on Trademarks clearly states). Although neither issue had anything to do with the overall goal of the book, I admit that I got both of them wrong. Perhaps these errors only point out how hard it is to bring such disparate fields together.

The reviewer’s objections to my comments on secondary meaning seem to emphasize the difficult and continuing differences between the fields. She points to the law, citing the Lanham Act (as I did) as the basis for what is called ‘secondary meaning’. This law allows a mark to be considered distinctive if it has been in use in the marketplace continually for five years and the owner spends more money on advertising and marketing than does a competing user of that mark. My objection to calling this ‘meaning’ is that from the standpoint of linguistics it has only the weakest possible claim to qualify as meaning. As Geoffrey Nunberg has indicated, it is pos-
possible that a term can acquire a particularized association without becoming a separate sense of the word. ‘September 11’, for example, is used to associate a specific date and event although we would not say that this is a new meaning of the expression. Likewise, ‘Make my day’ is associated with Clint Eastwood but he is not a distinct meaning for that expression.

Since the linguist’s job is to find and analyse meaning, trademark law’s effort to label the five year expenditure of money on advertising as some form of meaning (in the sense of the common understanding by the general public) seems to push the envelope of what meaning means, which is what I try to point out in the book. I would hope that a better name might be found for this legal concept, perhaps using a term such as ‘association’. I would also hope that this difference between our fields might be addressed in terms other than ‘that’s what the law says’.

The reviewer also criticizes my depiction of trademark law’s categories of marks: arbitrary and fanciful, suggestive, descriptive and generic, claiming that I overlooked the fact that they actually constitute a spectrum rather than separate categories. In response I must point out that the most often cited authority in trademark law, McCarthy on Trademarks, describes these categories in separate sections. I totally understand that most trademark infringement cases fall within the grey areas between these categories. This is not news to anyone who has worked on trademark cases. In fact most of the ten cases I describe took place precisely in the grey areas where the linguistic battles occurred.

The reviewer’s ‘primary criticism’ is that I neglect to say that the foundational purpose of trademark law is primarily to protect the consumer. However much lawyers may believe this claim, it was not evident in any of the ten cases I cite in the book, nor in any of the other uncited cases I have worked on. Nor is it evident from media descriptions of trademark infringement cases that the public might be able to see. Even the eminent trademark scholar, Jerre B. Swann, wrote that there is a serious question about the protection of the consumer in trademark dilution cases, where the entire concern is about protecting the owner (Trademark Review 2002: 611). If trademark law has such a lofty goal, it might be prudent to let the public in on this little secret. The cases I describe are all about money, with little or no evidence of concern for consumer interests.

I am disappointed that the bulk of Westerhaus’ comments come only from my chapters that come close to the ongoing interests of trademark lawyers rather than about my efforts to bridge the gap between linguistics and law. She focuses most of her attention on my Chapter 2, ‘A Very Brief Introduction to Trademarks for Linguists’, and Chapter 16, ‘Some Suggestions for Attorneys’. Left unreviewed are the ten chapters describing how linguistics was used in actual trademark cases, which I would hope might have attracted at least a little interest from a trademark lawyer/reviewer. In all fairness, however, I suppose that if a lawyer had written a similar book
which was then reviewed by a linguist, a similar imbalance might be found. Unfortunately, separate fields seem to be more comfortable talking about their own interests.

Of our disciplinary ideological differences about power, control and ownership of language, the reviewer says that my argument is ‘idealistic’. Perhaps it is. I have been called an idealist before, but I am saddened by the fact that she offers little hope here of any interdisciplinary cooperation on this topic, claiming and apparently endorsing the idea that, as she puts it, ‘law, as a construct, does, absolutely and inevitably, consider itself king over language’. I hope it is not imprudent for me to point out that I said many of the points found in my book at a recent convention of the International Trademark Association, at which I received a rousing positive reception. I take this to mean that there is some hope for cooperative interdisciplinary dialogue between the two fields after all.

Back in the days when I was teaching linguistics to graduate students at Georgetown, I held regular seminars on how to become a professional linguist. Among other things, the seminar included such topics as how to write research proposals, letters of recommendation, curriculum vitae, and book reviews. For most of these categories, I asked my students to find and bring to class examples that they considered both good and bad. As we discussed the book reviews together, the students were asked to list the reviews’ best and worst characteristics. Over the years the single most positive attribute was that the good review tells the readers enough about the book to enable them to decide whether or not to read it. When I asked them about reviews that were largely negative, they concluded, with considerable wisdom, that if a book is really bad it probably does not deserve to be reviewed at all. Perhaps most important, however, they concluded that a good review should represent the entire scope of the book, not just the part of it that might interest the reviewer. I would have hoped for a bit more from this review of my book.

Roger W. Shuy