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7. Nāgārjuna’s Catuṣkoṭi and Relativism About Rationality


 
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1. Title Title of document 7. Nāgārjuna’s Catuṣkoṭi and Relativism About Rationality - Buddhist Violence and Religious Authority
 
2. Creator Author's name, affiliation, country Blaze Marpet; Northwestern University (PhD candidate);
 
3. Subject Discipline(s) Buddhist Studies
 
4. Subject Keyword(s) Michael Jerryson; Buddhism and violence; religion and violence; religious nationalism; Buddhist history; Burma; religious authority
 
5. Subject Subject classification Buddhism and Violence
 
6. Description Abstract Michael Jerryson’s scholarship has focused on religious authority in Buddhism, and in so doing, his scholarship has raised questions about epistemic authority in the production of knowledge about religion. One such question is whether the development of logic in the West has any special epistemic authority or if rationality itself might be relative to culture, religious tradition, etc. In this vein, noting that Indian philosophical traditions seem to violate the principle of non-contradiction, the eminent Indologist Fritz Staal asks whether Indian philosophers use a logic—and by extension, rationality—altogether different from the Aristotelian and propositional logics developed in the West. Staal answers in the negative by arguing that the violations of the principle of non-contradiction are merely apparent. My aim in this paper is to re-examine the matter. I will ask a question that reaches further than Staal’s: even if the violations of the principle of non-contradiction were not merely apparent, would they entail (or otherwise provide support for) a relativism about rationality? I will contend that they would not, on the grounds that either Indian philosophers might simply be mistaken in violating the principle of non-contradiction or there are perfectly adequate non-Indian logics that can account for violations of the principle of contradiction (such as the paraconsistent logics developed by Graham Priest). In developing this argument, I will focus on the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna’s apparent violations of the principle of contradiction in his use of an argument form known as the catuṣkoṭi.
 
7. Publisher Organizing agency, location Equinox Publishing Ltd
 
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9. Date (YYYY-MM-DD) 01-Sep-2021
 
10. Type Status & genre Peer-reviewed Article
 
11. Type Type
 
12. Format File format PDF
 
13. Identifier Uniform Resource Identifier https://journals.equinoxpub.com/books/article/view/40727
 
14. Identifier Digital Object Identifier 10.1558/equinox.40727
 
15. Source Journal/conference title; vol., no. (year) Equinox eBooks Publishing; Buddhist Violence and Religious Authority
 
16. Language English=en en
 
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19. Rights Copyright and permissions Copyright 2014 Equinox Publishing Ltd